This paper summarizes the results of a large recent literature on multi year …scal plans for de…cit reduction (austerity). The key results are that de…cit reduction policies based upon spending cuts are much less costly in terms of short run output losses than tax based adjustments. . On average …scal adjustment based upon spending cuts have very samll otput costs and in come cases they are expansionary. We then discuss which possible models can explain these …ndings and discuss how the evidence can disentangle them.
Introduction
The literature on …scal multipliers is far from having reached an agreed upon conclusion about their size (sometimes even their sign) and how they might be state contingent.
1 There is so much debate about this issue, that Eric Leeper de…ned this literature as "alchemy". One result, however, seems very robust: in OECD economies …scal consolidations (austerity) based upon expenditure cuts are much less costly than those performed on the tax side.
This result was originally shown by an early literature which studied episodes of austerity before the …nancial crisis and the Great Recession. Alesina and Ardagna (2010) summarized and extended these results, which were then con…rmed in IMF (2010) and Guajardo et (2014) using Alesina: Dept of Economics, Harvard University,aalesina@harvard.edu, Favero: Dept.of Finance, Bocconi University, carlo.favero@unibocconi.it, Giavazzi: Dept. of Economics, Bocconi University, francesco.giavazzi@unibocconi.it. Acknowledgements 1 For reviews of the literature on …scal multipliers see Ramey (2016) and Alesina, Favero and Giavazzi (forthcoming) chapt. 4. a methodology based upon the narrative method pioneered by Romer and Romer (2010) . 2 The purpose of this paper is twofold. First we review more recent evidence based upon an extension of the narrative method which considers multi-year …scal plans rather than year-by-year shifts in …scal variables, like in Romer and Romer (2010) and Guajardo et al.(2014) . We shall argue that analyzing multi-year plans is a better way of studying the e¤ects of …scal policy because in the real world governments typically adopt, and legislatures vote, multi-year budget laws which have little resemblance to isolated …scal "shocks". We will also document cases of "expansionary austerity", namely episodes in which even large reductions of government spending were associated on impact with increases in GDP growth 3 -a possibility …rst recorded by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) . Second, we illustrate alternative theoretical explanations for our …ndings about spending-versus tax-based consolidations and we discuss which ones seem more appropriate in di¤erent cases.
2 Austerity: recent evidence
Estimating the Macroeconomic E¤ects of Austerity
When legislatures decide to launch a consolidation program, it rarely consists of a budget lasting only one year. It is instead, typically, a multi-year policy package designed to reduce the budget de…cit by a certain amount. The …rst decision is by how much the de…cit should be reduced 4 ; then, and often after much discussion, which taxes to increase and which expenditure items to cut. This means that if the goal is to reduce the de…cit by a certain amount, spending cuts and tax increases are not independent of each other since they must add up to a de…ned total. In addition, some measures are announced long before they are carried out, while other are implemented immediately. Thus the standard approach to evaluating …scal policy -which consists of assessing the e¤ects of year-by-year "isolated" shifts in taxes or spending -overlooks two important points. One is the multi-year nature of …scal adjustments which a¤ects the planning of consumers and investors to the 2 Alesina and Ardagna (2013) show how the results by Guajardo et al (2014) are in fact very similar to those by Alesina and Ardagna (2010) .
3 Note however, that, the 90 per cent con…dence intervals on the responses of GDP growth to a …scal correction lie in the negative quadrant. Impulse responses measure the di¤erence between the paths leading the economy to its steady state in presence and in absence of the …scal correction. 4 In the case of EU countries this decision needs to be reviewed by the European Commission before being submitted to Parliament. extent that their expectations matter. The other is the interdependence of the decisions about how much to cut spending and how much to raise taxes which cannot be assumed to be independent of one another and thus cannot be studied in isolation. Finally, in order to measure the macroeconomic consequences of a …scal adjustment plan one must use an empirical model which can track the e¤ects of the various measures (distinguishing between Expenditure Based (EB) and Taxed Based (TB) plans) on macroeconomic variables.
To construct …scal consolidation plans 5 we started from detailed information on the consolidations implemented by 16 OECD countries between 1978 and 2014. We address the potential endogeneity of shifts in …scal variables using the Romer and Romer (2010) "narrative" approach later applied to the countries in our sample by Devries et al. (2011) and extended by Alesina et al. (2015) . The …scal consolidation measures in the Devries et al. dataset (both tax increases and spending cuts) are selected reading the records available in o¢ cial documents to identify the size, timing and principal motivation for each …scal action. They are "exogenous"because their adoption was not motivated by the state of the economic cycle but rather were geared towards reducing an inherited budget de…cit or were meant to correct its long run trend, e.g. an increase in pension outlays induced by population aging. We have extended the Devries et al. dataset adding the consolidation measures implemented between 2010 and 2014. In order to construct …scal plans we have analyzed and identi…ed the legislative source of about 3500 different …scal measures adopted in these countries over our sample. This was necessary in order to use these measures to reconstruct …scal plans, for instance discriminating between measures announced and measures immediately implemented. This disaggregation was not in the original Devries at al. dataset. While doing this, we double checked their classi…cations. For example we exclude the Netherlands, which is included in the D&al. sample, because the data were not exogenous to the cycle by our de…nition.
We distinguish between several categories of …scal measures. For the analysis in this paper, however, we group measures in just two broad categories: spending, g, and taxes, . We classify as spending all measures related to government spending and investment: current expenditure for goods and services, public sector salaries, education, health care, government investment, among other. We include transfers in g because, theoretically, we expect a cut in transfers to be less distortionary than an increase in taxes -for instance transfers do not a¤ect the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. Our choice is supported by the …ndings in Alesina et al. 2017b who use a three-level disaggregation: tax-based plans, spending-based plans and transfers-based plans. We classify as taxes changes in direct taxes -e.g. income, pro…ts, capital gains and property taxes -and indirect taxes -e.g. VAT, sales taxes, excise duties on goods, and stamp duties. We include both changes in tax rates and measures designed to broaden the tax base.
Fiscal plans consist of a sequence of actions decided upon when a budget law is adopted, but some implemented immediately, other to be implemented in following periods. Plans are also a mix of measures, some a¤ecting government expenditures, other a¤ecting revenues. Typically legislatures start debating the overall size of an adjustment and then discuss its composition: by how much to cut spending (and which programs) and by how much to raise taxes (and which ones). The design of plans thus generates inter-temporal and intra-temporal correlations among …scal variables. The inter-temporal correlation is the one between the announced (future) and the unanticipated (current) components of a plan. The intra-temporal correlation is the one between the changes in revenues and in spending that determine the composition of a plan, given its size.
The exogenous …scal measures selected in our narrative analysis are thus classi…ed in three categories: measures that were immediately implemented ("unexpected"measures), measures that were written in the legislation but whose implementation was deferred ("announcements") and measures that were implemented in a given year but had been previously announced. We distinguish …scal plans between those that are expenditure based (EB) and those that are tax based (TB) by …rst summing all …scal measures (unanticipated, implemented but previously announced and announcements) and then labelling a plan TB if the largest component of the …scal correction (measured as a fraction of GDP the year before the budget law is introduced) is an increase in taxes. Similarly for EB plans.
To be able to simulate over time the e¤ect of a plan we need to construct "arti…cial" announcements. We do so estimating the in-sample correlation between announcements and unexpected measures. Note that EB and TB plans are mutually exclusive and this gets around the problem posed by the intra-temporal correlation of individual changes in g and in t. Measuring the macroeconomic impact of a plan requires modelling the relationship between plans and macroeconomic variables. This can be done either through Moving Average projections of macroeconomic variables on the di¤erent components of a plan, or by specifying a multivariate model, tpically a VAR, which includes both macroeconomic and …scal variables (see Favero and Giavazzi, 2012) . The Moving Aver-age approach has the advantage of being parsimonious; the VAR compensates the need for more degrees of freedom with several advantages. First using a VAR which includes changes in revenues and spending (as a fraction of GDP) and tracks the impact of the narratively identi…ed shifts in …scal variables on total revenues and total spending allows us to check the strength of our narratively identi…ed instruments -for instance it allows us to verify if, following a positive shift in taxes, revenues indeed increase. Second, in a VAR the estimated coe¢ cients on the narrativelyidenti…ed shifts in …scal variables measure the e¤ect on output growth of the component of such adjustments that is orthogonal to lagged included variables: thus the estimated multipliers are not a¤ected by the possible predictability of plans on the basis of the lagged information included in the VAR. Finally, a VAR allows to compute multipliers in two di¤erent ways: with respect to an initial …scal impulse and with respect to the cumulated change in …scal variables.
Empirical results
Alesina Favero and Giavazzi (forthcoming) uncover many strong regularities. 6 1) There is a large and statistically signi…cant di¤erence between the e¤ects on output of EB and TB austerity. EB …scal consolidations have, on average, been associated with a very small downturn in output growth: a spending based plan worth one percent of GDP implies a loss of about half of a percentage point relative to the average GDP growth of the country, which lasts less than two year. Moreover, if an EB austerity plan is launched when the economy is not in a recession, the output costs are zero on average. This average small downturns are the result of cases of EB plans that were more recessionary and others that were associated with almost immediate surges in output growth, that is "expansionary austerity".
Cases in which austerity was accompanied by growth in GDP higher than the average of other countries before the …nancial crisis include, amongst other, Austria, Ireland, Belgium and Denmark in the eighties, Spain and Canada in the nineties. On the other hand TB plans are associated with large and long lasting recessions. A TB plan worth one per cent of GDP is followed, on average, by a two percent fall in GDP relative to its pre-austerity path. This large recessionary e¤ect lasts several years. We report in Figure 1 the responses of output growth to an EB and TB plan worth one per cent of GDP as shown in Alesina et al. (2017a) within a plan-augmented multi-country panel VAR speci…cation for three variables: output growth, the change of tax revenues as a fraction of GDP and that of primary government spending, also as a fraction of GDP. 
2) The e¤ects of reductions in entitlement programs and other government transfers are very di¤erent from those of tax increases. They are accompanied by mild and short lived downturns, probably because these cuts are perceived as permanent, leading to a lower expected tax burden. Thus the evidence suggests that transfers are not akin to negative taxes.
3) Amongst the components of private demand, investment growth responds very di¤erently following the introduction of the two types of austerity plans. It responds positively to EB plans and negatively to TB plans. Business con…dence behaves consistently with private investment. Consumption, though, and also net exports, on average do not di¤er during the two types of adjustments.
4) The recent episodes of austerity which occurred after the …nancial crisis, and started during a recession, were not signi…cantly di¤erent from previous cases. The sheer size of some of these austerity plans was exceptional, not only in Greece but also in Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and to a lesser extent Italy and the UK. These episodes con…rm the major asymmetry in the e¤ects of the two types of plans. Countries that chose TB austerity su¤ered deeper recessions compared to those that decided to adopt EB plans. Amongst the latter are Ireland, despite a massive bank bailout program 7 and the UK, which posted a much more successful economic performance than the IMF had predicted when the country announced its spending based plan in 2010 (eventually the IMF apologized for having severely criticized the UK government).
5) Whether or not …scal consolidations, on both the tax side and the spending side, are more costly when started during an economic downturn is a di¢ cult point to discern. The answer depends on a variety of issues regarding the measurement of the dynamic pattern of the economy before and during the adjustment (see Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012, Ramey and Zubairy 2014). However, the asymmetry between EB and TB based austerity is robust to the adoption of a model that allows for di¤erent e¤ects of …scal adjustment in an expansion and a downturn (Alesina et al. 2017a) . Table 1 illustrate the point by showing the …scal multipliers of an EB and TB permanent …scal plan of one percent of GDP derived by simulating a Smooth Transition AutoRegressive (STAR) model with two states, recession and expansion, and a non-linearity associated with the composition of a …scal plan. That is we allow multipliers to di¤er depending on whether the …scal consolidation plan is tax-based or expenditure-based and the economy in in expansion or recession. The variables included in this panel VAR are the growth rate of per capita output , the change of tax revenues as a fraction of GDP and that of primary government spending, also as a fraction of GDP. Multipliers are computed following two de…nitions: we show a cumulated multiplier and a multiplier de…ned as the sum of the output response over the simulation horizon, divided by the sum of the primary surplus response. The latter is based on the de…nition suggested by Woodford 2011 and used by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012 and has the advantage of taking into account the response of taxes and spending to the …scal plan, as well as considering the persistence of …scal shocks. Note that since our simulated plans contain both spending and tax measures -and both expenditure and receipts react to EB an TB plans -what we compute here is a primary surplus multiplier. 7 In chooing a EB plan the Irish government mentioned the …dings about the relative cost of tax hikes and expenditure cut:"In framing Budget 2010, the Government focused on curbing spending to adjust expenditure needs to the revenue base which has been reduced as a result of the overall contraction of the economy and the loss of certain income streams. In addition, in formulating policy the Government took on board evidence from international organizations, such as the EU Commission, the OECD and the IMF, as well as the relevant economic literature which indicates that consolidation driven by cuts in expenditure is more successful in reducing de…cits than consolidation based on tax increases. Past Irish experience also supports this view and suggests that con…dence is more quickly restored when adjustment is achieved by cutting expenditure rather than by tax increases." (Ireland Stability Programme Update, December 2009, p. 15).
Regardless of the de…nition, the multipliers of EB plans are much lower (in absolute value) than those of TB plans, both in expansion and in recession. In expansion, a tax-based …scal consolidation plan of one precent of GDP has a cumulative multiplier of -1.5, while the cumulative multiplier of a spending-based plan of the same size is -0.46. Similarly, the primary surplus multiplier of a TB plan is -3.70, while that of a EB plan is -0.75. Multipliers in recessions are slightly lower (in absolute value) than in expansions, and exhibit a similar heterogeneity between TB and EB plans. Note. The table reports the cumulated and cumulated as fraction of cumulated primary surplus multipliers obtained from the Transition AutoRegressive (STAR) model with two states, recession and expansion, and a nonlinearity associated with the composition of a …scal plan (Alesina et al. (2017a) . 90 percent bootstrapped (1000 repetitions) con…dence intervals for the …rst column and one standard deviation for the second in parentheses.
The only exception to the results reported in Table 1 is observed when the Zero Lower Bound for monetary policy rate is also considered, although data from periods at the ZLB are still too few to draw clear conclusions.
What could explain these …ndings ?
How can we explain these results which are empirically quite striking? We can think of at least four arguments which we now review in turn.
Accompanying policies.
One "theory" is that the di¤erence between TB and EB plans is simply due to a systematic di¤erence in accompanying policies. The most obvious candidate is monetary policy. In fact Guajardo et al. (2014) argue that indeed di¤erences in the response of monetary policy are substantially responsible for these …ndings. Alesina, Favero and Giavazzi (forthcoming) instead show that only a small fraction of the heterogeneous e¤ects of EB and TB adjustments is related to monetary policy.
They do so by running a counterfactual simulation: they augment the baseline model including in the speci…cation a monetary policy indicator, the change in the short-term rate. They then compare the response of output growth to EB and TB plans in a baseline scenario, where monetary policy rates are allowed to respond to …scal policy, and in a counterfactual scenario where interest rates are constrained not to respond to shifts in …scal variables. The counterfactual simulation shows that the heterogeneous e¤ect of TB and EB plans on output is mitigated somewhat by the absence of a monetary policy response, but it remains highly signi…cant.
A second and related possibility could be that the di¤erence is explained by the behavior of the exchange rate. Note that exchange rate movements during a …scal plan are clearly endogenous to it; but a devaluation prior to the introduction of a plan may not be 8 and thus might explain the lower output cost of EB plans. Alesina Favero and Giavazzi (forthcoming) show that this is not the case. On average there is no systematic di¤erence in the behavior of the exchange rate before …scal adjustments based upon tax increases or spending cuts. The authors exclude from their sample all episodes of …scal consolidation that are preceded by a devaluation of at least three percent to at least 10 percent over the previous three years (which is approximately the 10th percentile of the distribution of the three-year cumulative change in the exchange rate). The results were unchanged. In addition if the exchange rate had been an important explanation of the di¤erence between TB and EB plans, the di¤erence between the two cases in terms of GDP growth, should be associated to a di¤erent behavior of net exports. This is not the case. As we discussed above, the driving force is domestic private investment.
Finally, large …scal adjustments are often periods of "deep" structural reforms which may include products and/or labor market liberalization. The latter may stimulate growth and if they were systematically occurring at the time of spending cuts, they may explain the …nding. The answer is no: these reforms do not occur systematically during periods of spending cuts. Note that this result is not inconsistent with the evidence and the case studies reported in Perotti (2013) and Ardagna (1998, 2013) . What these papers show is that amongst all …s-cal adjustments, the least costly were those accompanied by supply side reforms and by wage moderation. Our robustness check is di¤erent: we check whether the adoption of EB and TB adjustments can be explained by supply side reforms, and we …nd that it cannot.
Con…dence
With this (admittedly vague) term we identify situations in which a …scal consolidation removes uncertainty and stimulates demand by making consumers and especially investors more optimistic about the future. Imagine a situation -for instance as described in Alesina and Drazen (1991) -in which an economy is on an unsustainable path with an exploding public debt. Sooner or later a …scal stabilization has to occur. The longer one waits, the higher the taxes that will need to be raised (or spending to be cut) in the future When the stabilization occurs it removes the uncertainty about further delays which would have increased even more the costs of the stabilization.
9 Blanchard (1990) provides a simple model which illustrate this point. A stabilization which eliminates the uncertainty about higher …scal costs in the future stimulates demand today -especially, we may add, demand from investors, who are more sensitive to uncertainty about the future given the long run nature of their plans.
In their models Blanchard (1990) and Alesina and Drazen (1991) do not distinguish between stabilizations occurring on the tax or spending side. However it is quite likely that the bene…cial e¤ects associated with the removal of uncertainty are more likely to occur in the presence of EB rather than TB consolidation plans: a TB plan which does not address the automatic growth of entitlements and other spending programs which grow over time if much less like likely to produce a long lasting e¤ect on the budget. If the automatic increase of spending is not addressed, taxes will have to be continually increased to cover the increase in outlays. Thus the con…dence e¤ect is likely to be much smaller for TB plans, as expectations of future taxes will continue to rise. EB plans produce the opposite e¤ects. 10 Alesina and Ardagna (2010) and several papers reviewed therein, present evidence on the dynamics of government budgets consistent with this interpretation: spending based adjustments lead to more long lasting debt stabilization. Alesina, Favero and Giavazzi (forthcoming) present results on business con…dence which support this view. They show that, at least in their sample of OECD countries, business con…-dence increases immediately at the start of an EB consolidation plan, much more so that at the beginning of a TB plan. Croce et al. (2012) examine the e¤ects of corporate taxation on …rms'decisions, and hence on asset prices. Shocks to government expenditure generate tax risk for …rms, and the extent of this uncertainty depends on the government's …nancing policy and on its ability to pin down long-run tax dynamics.
The supply side: labor supply
Thus far we have not considered the supply side of the economy, but clearly tax hikes and spending cuts -beyond other e¤ects -have di¤erent e¤ects on labor supply.
Consider the e¤ects of TB and EB plans in the context of a basic neo-Keynesian model with tax distortions. EB plans are the least recessionary the longer lived is the reduction in government spending. Symmetrically, TB plans are more recessionary the longer lasting is the increase in the tax burden and thus in distortions. Consider a simple demand and supply framework. Assume that the government budget is always balanced through compensating changes in non-distortionary transfers.
11 A cut in government expenditure has two e¤ects. The demand curve shifts inward, due to the direct e¤ect of lower demand from the government. The supply curve also shifts inward: following a cut in government spending consumers feel richer because they expect higher transfers in the future. This lowers labor supply, which in turn leads to an increase in …rms'marginal costs. The shifts in aggregate demand and supply are functions of the persistence of …scal adjustments: higher persistence implies both higher demand and higher supply elasticities, because the long-term nature of …scal shocks makes consumers more sensitive to changes in prices and …rms more aggressive in their price settings. On the other hand, the present value of transfers increases with the persistence of spending cuts. The result is that aggregate demand reacts less, but labor supply falls more because of the wealth e¤ect. When persistence increases, the demand shift due to a cut in government expenditure starts to be dominated by the supply shift due to lower labor supply. The demand e¤ect falls faster than the supply e¤ect, so that the government spending multiplier decreases with persistence. Symmetrically, in the case of an increase in labor taxes, the multiplier increases with persistence. An increase in labor taxes has only a direct e¤ect on aggregate supply. This is because labor taxes create a wedge in the labor market but do not distort demand directly. As in the case of reductions in government consumption, higher persistence raises the elasticities of both supply and demand. Now, however, the shift in supply dominates: as persistence rises, this shift ampli…es. To put it simply, a persistent increase in labor taxes makes the static substitution e¤ect between labor and leisure more permanent and this increases the wage tax multiplier. To the extent that …scal adjustments are perceived to be permanent, and are on the supply side, a standard neokeynesian model thus implies that spending cuts are (much) less recessionary than tax hikes.
The supply side: network e¤ects
Following a di¤erent line of thought Acemoglu et al. (2015 and 2016) study the role of networks linking di¤erent sectors in the economy and the propagation of shocks across such networks. Network based analysis of the transmission of macroeconomic shocks starts from the observation that input-ouptut linkages can neutralize the law of large numbers. Studying the propagation of adjustments through input-output linkages Acemoglu et al. (2016) show that supply-side shocks propagate downstream more powerfully than upstream: downstream customers of sectors that are hit by a supply shock are a¤ected more strongly than upstream suppliers. The converse is true for demand shocks: they propagate more powerfully upstream. The reason for this asymmetric pattern lies in the fact that supply side shocks change the prices faced by customer industries, while demand side shocks have much smaller e¤ects on prices and propagate upstream.
12
How are these results related to the evidence illustrated in the previous paragraph? Fiscal adjustments based on increasing taxation have a strong supply-side component, while EB adjustments are one of the benchmark cases of demand-side adjustments. Because their propagation is totally di¤erent, the size of the …nal e¤ect on output of the two di¤erent types of …scal adjustments depend on di¤erent elements of the input-output matrix. EB adjustments, being mainly demand shocks, have a network e¤ect that goes through the connection of industry i with its customers. Symmetrically, TB adjustments, being mainly supply shocks, have a network e¤ect that goes through the connection of industry i with its suppliers. The empirical model for the measurement of the e¤ect of a …scal adjustment on value added growth is thus a global VAR model in which the e¤ect of EB and TB adjustments are the sum of a direct e¤ect and an indirect e¤ect driven by a sector and an adjustment speci…c global variable, i.e. a weighted average of added value growth in all the other sectors with weights that are speci…c to each sector and to the nature of the adjustment. Briganti et al. (2017) show that the simulation of such a model produces output e¤ects of TB and EB adjustments that reproduce the asymmetry documented in the previous paragraph.
